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v.. : 
MARVIN RAY WARDLE, : Case No. 14389 
Defendant-Appellant 
ARGUMENT 
In the brief of respondent the State has quoted verbatim 
the provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (Supp. 1975) 
and the definition of intentionally and knowingly contained in 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (Supp. 1975) and conclude that there was 
clearly sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of second degree 
murder. 
It is important to the appellant that the facts in the 
instant case be applied very carefully to the meaning of the various 
words and phrases contained in the Utah Second Degree Murder Statute. 
It is important to note that the actions of the appellant 
in the instant case were under circumstances that diminished his 
judgment because of his considerable drinking and provocation on 
the part of the deceased. Because of the provocation and heated 
passion it is contended that the appellant did not possess the necessary 
mental state to come within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 
(Supp. 1975). Paragraph A of the Second Degree Murder Statute requires 
the appellant to act intentionally or knowingly. If in fact the appellant's 
actions cause the death of the deceased, it could not in good conscience 
be argued that he acted with intent to kill. The appellant's 
subsequent actions after the incident by calling for the assistance 
of an ambulance and remaining at the scene until the victim was 
removed and taken to the hospital clearly reveal that he had no 
malice or intent to kill. To act knowingly, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 
(supp. 1975) Paragraph 2 requires a person to be aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. The result in the 
instant case would be the death of the victim Mr. Greed. It is 
argued that the appellant was not aware that his conduct was reasonably 
certain to cause the death of Mr. Greed. Even though the facts in 
the instant case go beyond the normal exchange of blows in a fight 
between two individuals, it certainly does not reach the porportions 
to where the one gaining a physical advantage over another would 
reasonably expect the punishment delivered to cause the death of the one 
receiving the punishment. It is also important to note that Mr. Greed 
was in poor physical condition because of years of alcoholism which 
caused the condition of decalcification of his bones which would account 
for the ease of fracturing his ribs and puncturing the vital organs 
which eventually lead to the death of Mr. Greed. 
To come within the meaning of Paragraph B of the Second 
Degree Murder Statute, the appellant must intend to cause serious 
bodily injury while commiting an act clearly dangerous to human life. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601 (9) (Supp. 1975) says that serious bodily 
injury means injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member 
— — ^ — ^ „moi-oci * substantial risk of death. In the instant case 
it would be necessary to show that the appellant had the intent to 
cause those conditions outlined in the definition of serious bodily 
injury, that is a specific intent to cause permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of the body member or 
create a substantial risk of death. It would be difficult to argue 
that while the appellant was engaged in combat that he was thinking 
about causing permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment 
of the body function or create a substantial risk of death. 
Paragraph C of the Second Degree Murder Statute would require the 
appellant to act under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference 
to human life while committing a reckless act which creates 
a grave risk of death. The definition of depraved indifference is 
completely lacking in the Utah Code but the dictionary definition 
suggests that the wickedness perversion and corruption would apply. 
Evidence of this nature is completely lacking in the instant case 
since it appears that the appellantTs reaction was more in line with 
heat of passion or extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Depravity 
would also be rebutted by the fact that the appellant attempted to 
protect the victim after the incident by calling for an ambulance 
and telling on-lookers to keep away from Mr. Greed. 
It is readily apparent upon a reading of the transcript 
that if the appellant is guilty of anything, his guilt would be more 
in line with negligent homicide or perhaps manslaughter. The 
negligent homicide statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (Supp. 1975) 
would require the appellant to do an act with criminal negligence. 
The definition of criminal negligence is explained in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-103(4) the definition basically requires that the appellant ought to 
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that the circumstances exist or the result will occur and the risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the appellant's standpoint. It seems clear that the conduct 
of the appellant is more in line with the standards set out in 
negligent homicide rather than the more aggravated circumstances 
in the second degree murder statute. 
Even though it is believed that negligent homicide is 
more applicable in the instant case, it should be pointed out that 
manslaughter is closer to what occured than second degree murder. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (Supp. 1975) provides for reckless conduct, 
conduct while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance and conduct where the appellant reasonably believes the 
circumstances provide a moral or a legal justification or extenuation. 
The reckless conduct under the manslaughter statute is the same as 
under the second degree murder statute except the second degree murder 
statute has the additional aggravating circumstances involving a 
depraved mind and creating a grave risk of death. The recklessness 
under the manslaughter statute would clearly be mor applicable to an 
argument situation and subsequent combat such as we have here than the 
recklessness in the second degree murder statute involving a depraved 
mind and knowledge that he is creating a grave risk of death. 
A reading of the transcript leaves considerable room for 
argument that some other force other than that of the appellant was 
present in this incident. There was competent medical testimony that 
in the opinion of the Doctor the victim had been hit by an automobile. 
This would be supported by the fact that the position of Mr. Greed's 
body when removed by the ambulance was a considerable distance 
from where the altercation occurred between the appellant and Mr. 
Greed. According to the testimony of Lynette Carr the altercation 
occurred in back of an automobile that was parked adjacent to the 
lounge. Mrs. Carr testified that she saw the appellant standing 
behind the automobile bracing his hand on the back fender on the 
driverfs side with his body moving in an up and down motion. The 
lounge was on the driver's side of the automobile with some distance 
between the automobile and the building. When Detective Lee Smith 
viewed the body Mr. Greed's head was a couple of feet from the car. 
The position that Mr. Smith described would place the body of Mr. 
Greed near the building on the other side of the car from where 
Lynette Carr testified the incident occurred. This would clearly 
indicate that some other force moved the body in the position 
that it was found at the time the ambulance arrived. Another fact 
to note is that a tread mark type of bruise was found on the deceased 
which was not consistent with the smooth surfaced shoe soles that the 
appellant was wearing at the time of the incident. This type of 
injury would seem to be more consistent with contact from the tires 
of a moving car or a third individual who may have been wearing 
heavy soled shoes. No unusual findings were discovered on the 
appellant's boots such as skin that would indicate a severe stomping. 
The blood that was found would not be inconsistent with a fight. 
The most the experts could say about the blood in any event is that 
it was human blood. It may have even been the appellants own blood. 
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produced at trial and were apparently destroyed. These items 
may have been important evidence concerning the question of 
whether or not the deceased could have been struck by an automobile. 
Other items of evidence such as the bridge lodged in the deceased 
throat which was apparently never removed was never explained. There 
was no evidence that the bridge belonged to the deceased. 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem clear that if in fact the appellant's 
action caused the death of Mr. Greed that the circumstances 
would not warrant a conviction of second degree murder but would be 
more consistent with negligent homicide. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LYNN R. BROWN 
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